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CYBERWEAPONS: POWER AND THE GOVERNANCE OF THE INVISIBLE 
Dr Tim Stevens, King’s College London, UK 




This article explores the non-emergence of a global governance regime for cyberweapons. 
Cyberweapons are malicious software entities deployed to cause harm to adversaries’ 
computer networks and systems. They threaten the integrity and functionality of digital 
systems that enable global circuits of communication and exchange, with significant potential 
impacts on social, economic and political order. Using a power-analytical approach, this 
article identifies four areas in which power works to constrain regime formation: the 
productive power of NATO’s Tallinn Manual Process; the structural power of US 
involvement in cyberweapons markets; the institutional power of Internet technologies; and 
diplomatic claims to sovereignty that mask the operations of compulsory power. These work 
together to prevent a unified global approach to the regulation of cyberweapons. The article 
concludes that there are substantial obstacles to effective cyberweapons governance but that 










It is over two decades since RAND analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt established 
‘cyberwar’ as a key concept in military thinking on information technology (Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt, 1993). Their original formulation of cyberwar as a mode of network-enabled 
military warfighting has been obscured by the term’s subsequent translation and frequent 
misapprehension (Kaiser, 2015). Today, cyberwar is more likely to refer to a global state of 
sub rosa ‘cyber skirmishing’ and online crime, or to large-scale attacks on national critical 
infrastructures (Libicki, 2009, 2012; Betz and Stevens, 2011, p. 97), than a military 
engagement, such is the attenuation of its conceptualisation (see also, Arquilla, 2016, pp. viii-
ix). However, militaries have embraced the promise that networked information technologies 
would restore the decisive advantage in war. They have become ‘smart’ or ‘cybered’ 
(Demchak, 2011), in military jargon, yet have frequently found themselves embroiled in 
relatively lo-tech expeditionary campaigns in which cognitive space has been as important as 
cyberspace (Betz, 2006; Lindsay, 2013a). Notwithstanding the persistence of the fog of war, 
modern militaries are now equipped to fight wars ‘according to information-related 
principles’ (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993, p. 146) that maximize knowledge of the battlespace 
using hi-tech sensor-to-shooter systems and networked C5ISR (command, control, 
communication, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), in an attempt 
to tip the balance in their favour. This has become so normalised that military cyberwar is 
effectively just ‘war’ (Betz and Stevens, 2011; Whetham, 2016, pp. 85-87), although there 
exist within this distinct modalities of cyberwarfare.  
 
Militaries – and their counterparts in the intelligence community – have also developed new 
tools for exploiting, subverting, degrading and destroying adversaries’ informational assets, a 
category of capabilities loosely described as ‘cyberweapons’. Rid and McBurney define 
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cyberweapons as ‘computer code that is used, or designed to be used, with the aim of 
threatening or causing physical, functional, or mental harm to structures, systems, or living 
beings’ (Rid and McBurney, 2012, p. 7; Rid, 2013, p. 37). This definition respects the 
established understanding of a weapon as ‘an offensive capability that is applied, or that is 
intended or designed to be applied, to an adversary to cause death, injury or damage’ 
(Boothby, 2016, p. 166). 
 
The best-known example of a cyberweapon is malware (malicious software) known as 
Stuxnet, exposed in 2010 as a joint US-Israel project to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program 
(Sanger, 2012, pp. 188-225; Zetter, 2014). Once introduced to the internal computer networks 
of the Natanz nuclear facility by unknown human agents, Stuxnet sought out industrial 
software applications running on the Windows proprietary operating system. It then 
subverted the operations of equipment controlling nuclear centrifuges used for uranium 
enrichment, whilst masking its own presence and providing false information to internal 
monitoring systems. The process reportedly resulted in substantial physical damage to the 
centrifuge array, with the assumption that Stuxnet was therefore successful in its intention to 
set back Iran’s nuclear program. This assessment has been subject to some dispute 
(Barzashka, 2013; Slayton, 2016) but Stuxnet is widely regarded as the first known example 
of a state-sponsored cyberweapon being deployed in peace-time against a strategic adversary, 
although no perpetrators have yet to admit officially to their involvement. Even if it cannot 
claim to have retarded Iranian nuclear enrichment decisively, Stuxnet may have been 
effective in damaging Iranian confidence in its own security (Libicki, 2011, pp. 142-143) and 
some deterrent value may therefore have been derived from its use (Lindsay, 2013b; 
Lupovici, 2016). It stands in the security imagination as a watershed in the use of 
cyberweapons for political effect and a possible harbinger of the character of future inter-
4 
 
state conflict (Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011, 2012; Collins and McCombie, 2012). More than 
sixty countries are reputed to be developing offensive cyber capabilities that might plausibly 
be considered cyberweapons (Valentino-Devries and Yadron, 2015). 
 
The operational potential of cyberweapons has yet to be demonstrated fully to the public. 
They surely cannot yet reduce a targeted polity to ‘Stone-Age technology’ (Glenny, 2012, p. 
245) but their continued development and use suggests they are important to the military and 
intelligence operations of any number of countries and non-state actors with access to the 
relevant technical capabilities (Gady, 2017). So too does the policy and academic attention 
given to their possible regulation since the late 1990s, which has produced a series of sensible 
proposals to limit or prohibit their development and use (Denning, 2000, 2001; Sofaer and 
Goodman, 2000; Rathmell, 2003; Prunkun, 2008; Ford, 2010; Geers, 2010; Meyer, 2011; 
Arimatsu, 2012; Wilson, 2013; Dunn Cavelty, 2014; Singer and Friedman, 2014, pp. 156-
162). These analyses have concentrated on obstacles to regime formation, of which four are 
especially pertinent and recurrent: the absence of a consensus on norms of development, 
possession and use; the physical nature of cyberweapons and the digital environment; market 
disincentives; and, great power relations. 
 
As of 2017, there is no international agreement on if or how cyberweapons should be 
regulated, nor is any formal overarching regime to do so imminent. Where the politics of this 
impasse are considered in previous work it is generally in the context of national interests or 
great power relations, principally those involving the US, Russia and China, that influence 
the cyberweapons debate in several important ways. However, there are limited discussions 
of cyberweapons that explore the operations of power beyond its conventional understanding 
as a mode of coercion and at scales other than the national or geopolitical. This article 
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addresses nascent attempts to regulate cyberweapons and explores the operations of power in 
the global information-technological assemblage that shape their development, possession 
and use. Specifically, it pursues a power-analytical reading of cyberweapons governance that 
hopes to better understand the regulatory effects of power within this field of security. Given 
the absence of a unified multilateral cyberweapons regime, this presents an opportunity to 
explore further how power operates to both facilitate and constrain the emergence of such a 
regime. 
 
This article pursues a plural conceptualisation of power as the manifold relationalities of 
power that constitute and manifest in security regimes. Power is not a given attribute of an 
actor or agent but becomes apparent through its effects on others, often through their 
resistance to a given action or set of actions. It emerges through social relations, sensu 
Latour’s (2005) sociomaterial theorisation of relations of the social, not merely from a 
conventional substrate of aggregate material capabilities. Social relations are, in one 
dimension – that of how power is expressed – either interactive or constitutive. In the second 
– regarding the specificity of the social relations of power – relations are direct and 
immediate, or indirect and diffuse. Mapped orthogonally, four categories of power can be 
identified: productive, structural, institutional and compulsory, which are described in detail 
elsewhere (Barnett and Duvall, 2005a, 2005b; Hynek, this volume). Productive power exists 
as the production of social actors through diffuse yet constitutive discursive and epistemic 
relations. Structural power works through the direct and mutual constitution of actors that 
determines their capacities, particularly through the production and reproduction of power 
hierarchies. Institutional power is evident in the indirect control or influence by one actor 
over the behaviours and conditions of existence of a socially distant other. Compulsory power 




These four modalities of power correspond to the four principal obstacles to regime 
formation outlined above and structure the remainder of this article. The first section explores 
the role of the NATO Tallinn Manual Process in constructing cyberweapons as legitimate 
military instruments. This acts as a locus of epistemic authority that permeates NATO 
members’ policy and doctrine on cyberwarfare and shapes key actors’ subjectivities in 
hegemonic fashion, which prompts resistance from NATO’s strategic adversaries. Section 
two identifies the role of US structural power in incentivising cyberweapons markets, which 
undermines multilateral attempts to regulate dual-use technologies associated with 
cyberweapons. The third section looks at the Internet as a source of institutional power. It 
argues that the design of the Internet provides affordances for cyberweapons, a situation at 
odds with the desires of the US, in particular, as the creator of the global Internet. This 
represents an ontological delimiting of hegemonic authority. The final empirical section 
addresses the diplomatic relations of the great powers, which resolve to differing 
interpretations of sovereignty and further constrain the emergence of a global cyberweapons 
regime. The article concludes by describing the manifold operations of power in the round 
and enquires after the prospects for global cyberweapons governance. 
 
PRODUCTIVE POWER AND THE TALLINN MANUAL PROCESS 
Rid and McBurney’s analysis of cyberweapons recognises that ‘identifying something as a 
weapon means, at least in principle, that it may be outlawed and its development, possession, 
or use may be punishable’ (Rid and McBurney, 2012, p. 11). This suggests that 
cyberweapons might be suitable objects of global regulation or prohibition, practical 
difficulties in implementing such a regime notwithstanding. This focus on the regulatory or 
prohibitive outcomes of constructing software as weaponised code is understandable but 
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elides equally important aspects of cyberweapons discourse.  Conferring weapons status on 
software is a means of legitimation as much as a mode of disciplinarity and constraint. For 
militaries and intelligence agencies, the entry of cyberweapons into policy and doctrine 
facilitates the use of cyberweapons, not their abandonment. The principal locus for 
developing norms around cyberweapons continues to be the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn, Estonia. This became operational in 
2008 as a formal International Military Organization (IMO) under NATO auspices and 
provides support to NATO and its member states on a range of cybersecurity and cyber 
defence issues. Contrary to popular belief, it was not founded in response to the politically 
motivated cyber attacks on Estonia in spring 2007, a series of events dubbed ‘the first real 
war in cyberspace’ (Landler and Markoff, 2007). The Centre had been approved in 2006 but 
the subsequent cyber attacks helped promote Estonia and the CCD COE in particular as key 
loci of technical capability and epistemic authority on cyber issues (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 
2009). 
 
At the heart of CCD COE activities is the Tallinn Manual Process (hereafter, TMP), an 
ongoing legal analysis of the applicability of international law to cyber conflict. This led to 
the publication of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 
(Schmitt, 2013).1 The consensus emerging from the TMP’s International Group of Experts is 
that the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law do apply to cyberwarfare 
and, as such, cyberwarfare should be bound by the same legal frameworks that apply to other 
forms of military force. The TMP is not legally binding but the findings articulated in the 
Tallinn Manual have been incorporated rapidly into defence policy, strategy and doctrine. 
State parties like the UK and US affirmed the principles of the first volume in legal advice 
                                                          
1 A second volume on international law and cyber operations that do not reach the threshold of war (Schmitt, 
2017) was not published in time to be considered in this article. 
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(Koh, 2012) and in defence strategy (Ministry of Defence, 2013; US Department of Defense, 
2015a). US military doctrine also respects TMP opinio juris on matters of cyberwarfare (US 
Department of Defense, 2015b), and NATO adopted TMP principles into its Enhanced Cyber 
Defence Policy (NATO, 2014, article 72) and Cyber Defence Pledge of July 2016 (NATO, 
2016). 
 
Rule 41 of the Tallin Manual defines cyberweapons and cyberweapons systems as ‘cyber 
means of warfare that are by design, use, or intended use capable of causing either (i) injury 
to, or death of, persons; or (ii) damage to, or destruction of objects, that is, causing the 
consequences required for qualification of a cyber operation as an attack’ (Schmitt, 2013, p. 
119). The cyberweapon is that part of the cyberweapons system ‘used to cause damage or 
destruction to objects or injury or death to persons’ (Schmitt, 2013, p. 119). Additionally, use 
of cyberweapons must respect conventional norms of jus in bello and meet criteria of military 
necessity, proportionality and discrimination. Stuxnet is singled out in this regard as an 
example of a carefully planned operation against a discrete target, with due attention paid to 
minimising collateral damage (Schmitt, 2013, p. 141). States are obliged to consider the 
likely effects of military cyber operations ahead of deployment and to terminate them if they 
do not meet these criteria. This concern with weapons effects, rather than cyberweapons per 
se, is a consistent feature of the TMP and guides current US Department of Defense and State 
Department discussions on cyberweapons use (McGhee, 2016; Pomerleau, 2017). It is also 
consistent with historical targeting procedures of US military and intelligence with respect to 
cyber operations (Hayden, 2016, pp. 146-147). 
 
In the absence of clear-cut precedents, how cyberwarfare and international law articulate will 
continue to develop through legal analysis and operational adaptation. The principal author of 
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the Tallinn Manual conceded that the TMP might change little, except, crucially, ‘improved 
adherence to the rule of law in cyberspace’ (Maher, 2013). It is in this normative sense, 
however, that the TMP is both a powerful agent of change and an expression of wider 
geopolitical issues that hinder the formation of a global regime for cyberweapons. In the first 
instance, the TMP ‘produces reality … domains of objects and rituals of truth’ (Foucault 
1995, p. 194). This is a reality in which software and hardware combine to form 
cyberweapons systems with the capacity to cause harm analogous to an armed attack. It 
produces these informational objects as weapons, which therefore renders them normalised 
within military discourse and practice and as valid objects of legal sanction within the 
existing framework of customary international law. The aim of the TMP is not prohibition 
(Nadelmann, 1990) but facilitation of state use of cyberweapons. There is no suggestion that 
cyberweapons should be banned, except, perhaps, if used in specific categories of offensive 
action against civilians and civilian infrastructures (Barrett, 2013; Simpson, 2014). The 
intention is to provide a legal basis for the use of cyberweapons in war, so as to maintain and 
even maximise states’ liberties of movement and action in global information environments. 
A regime governing weapons use and the conduct of war is already in place and efforts are 
therefore directed towards establishing its applicability to cyberwarfare and cyberweapons. 
The translation of TMP’s principles and legal opinion into supranational (NATO) and 
national legal frameworks, policy, military doctrine and strategy, provides militaries with the 
‘rules of the game’. These allow them to always be ‘playing to the edge’ (Hayden, 2016) of 
the legal box circumscribing the use of cyberweapons in war. 
 
The TMP also aids the formation of differentiated subjectivities contingent on actors’ 
perceived attitudes to international law. The operational modes and means of cyberwarfare 
are deemed legitimate when used by states acting in compliance with the laws of war and 
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international humanitarian law. Countries that do not adhere to these norms must be deemed 
illegitimate, a list that, from a NATO perspective, inevitably includes Russia, China, Iran and 
North Korea, all of which have demonstrated proficiency and intent in the use of offensive 
cyber capabilities (Singer and Friedman, 2014; Segal, 2016) and without due regard for jus 
cogens. It also includes the use of cyberweapons by non-state actors, which is a priori 
illegitimate and fuels fears of ‘cyberterrorism’, a broad category of action for which little 
empirical evidence exists (Conway, 2011; Jarvis et al, 2014; Jarvis and Macdonald, 2015). 
The attempted fixing of subjectivities is, however, contested, particularly by Russia, which 
sees in the TMP evidence of a hegemonic thrust serving US interests (Krutskikh and 
Streltsov, 2014, p. 75). The US perceives that Russia and China disapprove of the TMP 
because it would make their own use of cyberweapons a matter of international legal 
attention (von Heinegg, 2015; Painter, 2016). This is a further expression of a longstanding 
disagreement between ‘West’ and ‘East’ over issues of Internet governance and state use of 
cyberspace (Stevens, 2012). 
 
The TMP as a system of power-knowledge is centred on Estonia and the CCD COE and 
initially materialised in the artefact of the Tallinn Manual itself. Its translation into a range of 
NATO members’ policy and doctrine demonstrates its mobility through the assemblages of 
military cooperation, standardisation and interoperability and its consequent rematerialisation 
in a wide range of institutional and informational forms. Cyberweapons are produced and 
legitimised as a weapons class through these discursive moves and reproduced via further 
mediations and wider political discourses. The aim of this process is to demonstrate that 
cyberweapons belong in the modern military arsenal and to define where the boundaries of 
their potentialities lie. This can only be achieved by asserting that international law applies to 
cyberweapons and that it provides for their permissive regulation. If it did not, either new 
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laws would be required, or cyberweapons would have to be abandoned, or they could only be 
used illegally; none of these options is attractive to NATO and its members. The productive 
power of the TMP serves to strengthen norms around cyberweapons use in war but also 
reifies and entrenches disagreements over those norms between NATO and its principal 
strategic adversaries. 
 
STRUCTURAL POWER AND CYBERWEAPONS MARKETS 
Any discussion of US leadership of NATO and its effects on international order must also be 
situated within considerations of its structural power in the global political economy. The US 
is the unquestioned leader in information-technological development and its cyberwarfare 
capabilities grant it a unique position in cyberweapons research and innovation. The Trump 
administration has indicated its willingness to accelerate the development and deployment of 
cyberweapons, which in turn may facilitate a cyber ‘arms race’ and destabilise international 
relations (Gady, 2017). There already exist robust cyberweapons markets of varying degrees 
of legality, particularly in ‘zero-days’, an essential component of any cyberweapon. Zero-
days may be used in both defensive and offensive contexts and are an essential facet of 
cybersecurity research. Dorothy Denning, an early supporter of ‘cyber arms controls’, states 
explicitly that global prohibition of cyberweapons is neither desirable nor possible (Denning, 
2001). One key reason is that prohibition of cyberweapons – or their zero-day components – 
would inhibit cybersecurity research and lead to greater insecurity in the global information 
environment. This argument has resurfaced since 2013, when the Wassenaar Arrangement on 
Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods (1996) was extended to various 
classes of software and hardware ‘specially designed or modified for the generation, 
operation or delivery of, or communication with, “intrusion software”’ (Granick, 2014). The 
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debate over this revision shows how the US’ structural power serves to undermine the 
regulation of cyberweapons. 
 
Cyberweapons consist of three components, the absence of any one of which denies the 
categorisation of malware as a weapon proper: propagation method, payload and exploits 
(Herr, 2014). The propagation method defines how the code is delivered into a target system 
and the payload is the core executable code of the malware that determines its functionality 
and delivers its effects. The third component, the exploit, allows both propagation and 
payload delivery by taking advantage of vulnerabilities in computer systems and their 
defensive measures. Most software is demonstrably insecure in this context, either through 
failure to conform with security standards or as a result of code transcription and other errors 
in programming. ‘There is no forced entry in cyberspace’, writes Martin Libicki, ‘If a 
destructive message gets into a system, it must be entirely across pathways that permit such a 
message to get through’ (Libicki, 2007, pp. 35). Pathways may be human vectors, the targets 
of ‘social engineering’ (Abraham and Chengular-Smith, 2010), but most are ‘bugs’ in 
proprietary software and systems that inadvertently allow code to be infiltrated through any 
defensive measures that may be present. 
 
Software bugs are usually unknown to system programmers, operators and users until they 
are exploited for the purposes of malware insertion. These vulnerabilities are often referred to 
as ‘zero-day’ (‘0-day’) vulnerabilities, indicating the time available to devise and deploy 
measures mitigating the possible or actual damage caused by their exploitation. ‘Zero-day 
exploits’ are malware written specifically to take advantage of undisclosed zero-day 
vulnerabilities before responsible parties can issue and apply ‘patches’ to rectify coding 
errors.  This temporal advantage means that zero-day exploits are ‘the most powerful attack 
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available to offensive cyber units’ (Carr, 2010, p. 152). Stuxnet’s use of at least four zero-day 
exploits indicates to many analysts the necessary involvement of at least one state party in its 
development, given the substantial resources required to identify any zero-day vulnerabilities, 
let alone several (Langner, 2011). 
 
Zero-day vulnerabilities and exploits are of tactical and operational value but have significant 
financial value too. They are a highly desirable commodity and markets have evolved to 
satisfy demand for them. These have developed within the framework of a significant growth 
in markets for hacking tools, services and data obtained from cybercrime (Kshetri, 2010; 
Ablon et al, 2014). Zero-day markets trade in vulnerabilities and exploits, the relative 
proportion of which differs according to whether a market is characterised as white, grey, or 
black (Libicki et al, 2015, p. 44). In white markets, vulnerabilities are sold to software 
vendors offering ‘bug bounties’, so that vulnerabilities can be addressed before damage 
occurs. In this context, zero-days are not cyberweapons, as only vulnerabilities are traded, not 
exploits, and there is no intent to harm. Grey market actors are often government agencies or 
contractors that purchase vulnerabilities and exploits short of weaponisation (pseudo-
exploits). These can be used either for state-sanctioned offensive purposes, or to improve 
defensive measures. One grey market instrument is the Vulnerabilities Equities Process of the 
US National Security Agency (NSA), which decides what to do when vulnerabilities are 
brought to the attention of the NSA (Schneier, 2015). The NSA claims it discloses 
vulnerabilities to software vendors so they may be patched, but activists accuse it of holding 
back vulnerabilities for intelligence and offensive cyberwarfare purposes, thereby putting 




Black zero-day markets are geared to cybercriminal purposes and trade in exploits and their 
associated vulnerabilities. These are inaccessible to ordinary users as they are in the so-called 
Dark Web, part of the World Wide Web that is not indexed by conventional search engines. 
Additionally, portions of the Dark Web exist on top of ‘darknets’, networks that can only be 
accessed using specific software installations and network configurations (Rid and Moore, 
2016). These are peer-to-peer networks that hide, encrypt or anonymise Internet traffic, 
therefore making it difficult for investigators to establish user identity and location or the 
content of their communications. There are few academic studies of zero-day black markets 
but researchers and journalists indicate that increased recognition of their existence is 
accompanied by a rise in users’ suspicion of external intervention, not least by government 
agents – who are sometimes also buyers – and greater premiums on discretion and ‘knowing 
the right people’ to facilitate trustworthy transactions (Egelman et al, 2013; Ablon et al, 
2014, pp. 25-28; Tsyrklevich, 2015; Zetter, 2015). 
 
Empirical data on cyberweapons prices and trade volumes are hard to obtain. Market 
researchers tend to over-value cyberweapons markets by several orders of magnitude, as they 
conflate cyberweapons with other information security products and services, notably anti-
virus software. Estimates of $522 billion in 2021 (Transparency Market Research, 2015) and 
$4 trillion by 2024 (Market Info Group, 2013) are therefore heavily skewed towards legal 
markets in cybersecurity goods and services that do not qualify as cyberweapons in the sense 
intended here. An alternative indicator of market values is provided by unit costs for 
particular types of exploit, which range from a few thousand dollars to tens, even hundreds, 
of thousands of dollars, depending on the software targeted, the severity and longevity of a 
vulnerability, the sophistication of the exploit, and the disposition and identity of the buyer 
(Ablon et al, 2014, p. 26). In November 2015, security company Zerodium – ‘We pay big 
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bounties, not bug bounties’ – claimed to have paid hackers a ‘seven-figure sum’ for an 
exploit targeting Apple iPhones and iPads (Greenberg, 2015). Zerodium, like many other 
companies, counts governments amongst its clients. Zero-day markets therefore display a 
range of incentives, rewards, and dynamics of supply and demand, and are subject to a range 
of ethical constraints and actor motivations (Miller, 2007; Egelman et al, 2013). 
 
The revised Wassenaar Arrangement was the first multilateral attempt to incorporate 
technology associated with cyberweapons into an international regime, although it stopped 
short of controls on intrusion software itself, in which category tools like zero-day exploits 
fall. The UK was a key driver of the amendment, keen to deflect domestic and international 
condemnation of British firms supplying surveillance technologies to authoritarian regimes, a 
category also covered by the revised Wassenaar Arrangement (Omanovic, 2015). The 
European Union and member-states like the UK implemented the new rules in relatively 
unproblematic fashion at the end of 2014 (Tung, 2014; Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills, 2015). In the US, however, implementation foundered on the key issue of its 
impact on legitimate cybersecurity research (Blue, 2015; Pyetranker, 2015).The principal 
objection is that Wassenaar exposes all cyberweapons research to potential criminalisation if 
it falls foul of export controls. At the same time, the US is the main purchaser of exploits, 
which incentivises the market and makes it unlikely to abstain from transactions it sees as 
beneficial to its national and economic security.  
 
Cyberweapons markets are supported by robust consumer demand, both state and non-state, 
and there are no obvious alternative goods and services, factors that act against their 
successful prohibition (Nadelmann, 1990, p. 486). Without firm US support, their regulation 
via mechanisms like the Wassenaar Arrangement is unlikely to achieve its desired effect, 
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although, in common with other arms export control regimes, it may have some longer-term 
utility in promoting multilateral norms on dual-use technology transfer (Pyetranker, 2015). 
However, US structural power as the dominant producer and consumer of cyberweapons 
components and research disincentivises market regulation and encourages international trade 
in code entities like zero-day exploits. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL POWER AND THE INTERNET  
The issue of cyberweapons falls under the rubric of cybersecurity as broadly understood. It is 
well-established there is no global regime for cybersecurity governance and a significant 
literature exists querying why this is and how to remedy this situation (e.g. Hughes, 2010; 
Sofaer et al, 2010; Stevens, 2012; Mueller et al, 2013; Hurwitz, 2014; Nye, 2014). This 
mirrors the wider milieu of Internet governance, which has long rejected the possibility of 
holistic governance of such a complex and extensive entity in favour of identifying which 
aspects of the Internet require what forms of governance (DeNardis, 2014, p. 226; Mueller, 
2010). This has led to the emergence of a ‘regime complex’ of ‘loosely coupled sets of 
regimes’ (Keohane and Victor, 2011, p. 7) for governing specific forms of activity in and 
through the Internet (Nye, 2014). This includes regimes and institutions with dedicated 
responsibilities for core Internet governance issues like technical policies and standards, and 
those with jurisdictions that originate outside Internet governance but overlap with it, such as 
telecommunications, finance, trade, intellectual property, and national security. So diverse is 
this regulatory and sociotechnical landscape that it seems ‘unlikely that there will be a single 
overarching regime for cyberspace any time soon’ (Nye, 2014, p. 13; Hurwitz, 2014). Indeed, 
the ‘multistakeholder’ model has become the dominant template for managing global Internet 




This focus on regimes and institutions has shown how institutional power operates in the 
international system to promote and contest forms of cybersecurity governance. As we have 
seen, various institutions are engaged in aspects of cyberweapons governance also, such as 
NATO, the CCD COE and the Wassenaar Arrangement. What is missing from most of these 
accounts is a consideration of the institutional power of the Internet itself (DeNardis, 2012, 
2014). Like all infrastructures, the Internet is the product of social action and embedded 
within it are the outcomes of decisions and contestations that shape social behaviours and 
‘present a formidable set of real constraints on the realm of the possible’ (Deibert, 2003, p. 
530; Aradau, 2010). McCarthy explicitly frames the Internet as a ‘technological institution’, 
which by ‘including and excluding certain practices the Internet prevents and promotes goals 
in line with the goals of its designers’ (McCarthy, 2015, p. 67). The design decisions, norms 
of use, even technical standards, of the Internet thereby instantiate the institutional power of 
major actors in this technological space. As the originator of the Internet architecture and the 
rules that govern its functionality, US hegemony is therefore supported by the institutional 
power of the Internet (McCarthy, 2015, p. 68). In many respects this is demonstrable, but 
cyberweapons require that we amend and our understanding of the institutional power of the 
Internet. Specifically, how do cyberweapons challenge the supposed alignment of design 
goals and political intent implied by this model of institutional power? 
 
The original design decision of the Internet is that it was built with little concern for security, 
prioritising instead the ease and speed of communication between geographically distant 
nodes like universities and defence establishments (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2007, p. 6). 
Since its inception in the 1960s, the Internet has evolved to become the most remarkable and 
ubiquitous technology of its age, but it remains insecure and prone to exploitation and 
subversion (Barnard-Wills and Ashenden, 2012). This is not to say that it is easy to do so but 
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that it may be so compromised by actors with the requisite technical skills and malicious 
intent. Revisiting the thesis that there is ‘no forced entry in cyberspace’ (Libicki, 2007, p. 35) 
provides us with an opportunity to examine cyberweapons in the context of institutional 
power. Cyberweapons do not break through defences like a battering ram but are more like a 
stiletto blade inserted between the ribs (Stone, 2013, p. 106). In this analogy, the soft skin and 
tissue between the ribs offers the potential for the insertion of the stiletto – it is an affordance, 
understood as an opportunity for action embedded in the environment.2 Affordances may or 
may not be recognised by an actor but they are there, ‘a property of both the environment and 
the perceiving organism, and where in that interaction opportunity for action lies’ (Taylor, 
2012, p. 8). 
 
Cyberweapons do not perceive their environment in an animal sense but they are 
programmed to seek out affordances (vulnerabilities) and exploit them for payload delivery 
(Herr, 2014). Once inside a target system, they can manipulate its conditions of existence and 
functionality. At the ‘smart’ end of the spectrum, cyberweapons act as ‘intelligent agents’ 
that access specific systems, evaluate these environments, and act autonomously to achieve 
particular goals (Rid and McBurney, 2012, p. 9; also, Valeriano and Maness, 2014, pp. 353-
355). The affordances that provide cyberweapons with their action opportunities may arise 
from deficiencies in design processes (‘the Internet was built for simplicity not security’), or 
from the emergent properties of complex systems (‘we didn’t expect that’). In the former 
situation, the policy answer is to promote better cybersecurity, to reduce the ‘attack surface’ 
of information systems, and to invest in cyber defences both active and passive. In the latter 
case, the picture is more complicated. It may be that it is impossible to design software and 
information systems that do not provide affordances for malware. Formal verification of 
                                                          
2 I am indebted to Samuel Forsythe for this insight. 
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software security has long been a goal of software engineers (Mackenzie and Pottinger, 1997) 
and an elusive one at that. It was only in 2016 that programmes like the DARPA-funded 
High-Assurance Cyber Military Systems project have suggested that perfect software security 
might be attainable but this is a long way from network-level deployment (Hartnett, 2016). 
Even were this possible, it would still not mitigate human error. Cyberweapons systems 
cannot be understood only as combinations of software and hardware but as assemblages also 
incorporating human actors (Danks and Danks, 2016). Weapons are always hybrid 
assemblages of non-human and human entities (Latour, 1994; Bourne, 2012), which within 
themselves also offer affordances for action. 
 
This picture is complicated further because cyberweapons have no conventional physical 
form. They are software, ‘information objects’ that lack corporeality but whose existence, 
operations and effects necessarily involve physical processes, entities and events (Dipert, 
2014, pp. 36-37). This property alone sets cyberweapons apart from most other weapons 
classes, the majority of which possess identifiable material forms of payload and delivery 
system. Cyberweapons are ‘latent’, in that they are ‘in the world but not experienced as part 
of the world’ (Floridi, 2014, p. 318), until their effects manifest in more conventionally 
apprehensible fashion. This is an important consideration, as their immateriality complicates 
their practical identification and interdiction, and also because all existing legal regimes 
recognise weapons as material entities (Mele, 2013, p. 9; Jenkins, 2013). Like the conflicts of 
which they are a part, cyberweapons ‘require special interfaces to be perceived [and] a 
special sensitivity to be eradicated’ (Floridi, 2014, p. 319). The invisibility of digital 




These observations offer an important corrective to the view that the institutional power of 
the Internet inevitably supports the hegemonic interests of the United States. We might argue 
that cyberweapons exploit vulnerabilities caused in part by the very technological institution 
created by the US in the first place. This is not a question of blame but it does suggest that the 
institutional power of the Internet can work against the interests of even those actors whose 
structural and productive power is most evident. In 1991, when the term ‘electronic Pearl 
Harbor’ was coined, its progenitor Winn Schwartau drew special attention to the vulnerability 
of a ‘processing-intensive society’ like the US (Schwartau, 1991). The implication over the 
last quarter-century has been that the US is uniquely vulnerable to informational attacks. This 
impression has been attenuated somewhat as the Internet has spread globally but the 
ontological condition of insecurity is perhaps felt most acutely by those countries in which 
Internet penetration is the greatest and, further, illustrates the limits of US hegemony. The 
institutional power of the Internet will continue to promote the utility of cyberweapons until 
such time as the technological institution itself can be organised and built differently. 
 
COMPULSORY POWER AND DIPLOMACY 
The operations of compulsory power form the last modality of power considered here. Under 
specific consideration is how the diplomatic actions and motives of the great powers – US, 
Russia, China – prevent policy coordination and the formation of a global regulatory or 
prohibition regime for cyberweapons. In the previous discussion of productive power and the 
Tallinn Manual Process, we alluded to the existence of a diplomatic standoff between the US 
and Russia/China on matters of Internet governance and state use of cyberspace. This 
disagreement colours the discussion of cyberweapons regulation irrevocably and is rooted in 
national conceptions of the applicability of sovereignty to the global information 
environment. What results is an impasse that delivers little diplomatic progress towards a 
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binding regime whilst allowing for the continued development and operational deployment of 
cyberweapons.  
 
The debate about sovereignty and the Internet is two decades old and remains unresolved. 
Indeed, it has become one of the central features of international policy and diplomacy on 
Internet-related issues, particularly Internet governance, which must surely be considered a 
mature domain of global policy. The same perhaps cannot be said of cyberwarfare, although 
the Tallinn Manual Process and various national initiatives stemming from it have at least 
advanced an understanding of cyberwarfare as amenable to regulation under customary 
international law. In either field, however, sovereignty remains the central concept, the 
contestation of which is inhibiting more expansive regulatory regimes. As with any form of 
international policy coordination and cooperation, the primary consideration for states is 
‘how much’ sovereignty must be ‘given up’ in order to achieve collective ends. In the 
example of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, for example, which is open for 
ratification by any state, neither Russia nor China will sign on account of fears that the 
transnational police coordination the Convention requires would violate their national 
sovereignty and security and is consequently a price not worth paying (Clough, 2014). Both 
countries prefer instead the forum of the regional Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
for discussion and resolution of cybercrime issues (Dalla Guarda, 2015). 
 
The reasons for this surface also in their rejection of the Tallinn Manual Process, in which 
several different forms of sovereignty are at play. As Betz and Stevens (2011, pp. 55-74) 
assess, not all forms of sovereignty are affected equally by the Internet. International legal 
sovereignty is barely affected, as the Internet does not impact states’ sovereign equality in 
international law. Conversely, transnational data flows pose a major challenge to 
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interdependence sovereignty and the ability of states to control these cross-border flows. 
When ideas are transmitted across national borders they can also pose a threat to domestic 
sovereignty. When malware does, it violates Westphalian sovereignty and the principle of 
non-interference in domestic affairs. China and Russia’s concerns prioritise domestic and 
interdependence sovereignty and the deleterious effects of externally-generated information 
on domestic security and regime stability. Moreover, both China and Russia, in common 
cause with other authoritarian regimes, promote ‘Internet sovereignty’ or ‘cyber sovereignty’ 
as a means of reinforcing domestic control and authority (Nocetti, 2015; Zeng et al, 2017). 
This is visible in a range of repressive measures aimed at curtailing freedom of speech and 
expression online and the influx of subversive ideas across their territorial borders (Deibert 
and Crete-Nishihata, 2012). It is also the driver behind Sino-Russian proposals for 
multilateral information security agreements that would enshrine these prerogatives in law 
(Dalla Guarda, 2015, pp. 223-236). Information security is not a technical prospect in these 
proposals but a process of controlling ideas and information within sovereign borders. 
 
The rejection of the Tallinn Manual Process speaks to this situation in various ways. The US 
is attempting to apply existing international law to cyberwarfare and cyberweapons and 
rejects calls for an international treaty, whilst promoting global norms for state uses of 
cyberspace. It does this to preserve its freedom of movement in foreign territories and 
networks within the framework of international law. Russia and China are seeking an 
international treaty that would cover cyberwarfare, in order to preserve their freedom of 
action at home. Through a process of ‘forum shopping’ (Murphy and Kellow, 2013), China 
and Russia have settled on the SCO and the UN’s International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) as the appropriate venues for promoting this project. The former is the principal 
strategic counterpart to NATO and de jure excludes the United States. The US in turn holds 
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the ITU in as low regard as Russia and China do the CCD COE in Tallinn. Each ‘side’ in this 
competitive process to win other states’ support considers its own fora as the proper loci of 
relevant epistemic and moral authority. Neither side is disposed to shift from its diplomatic 
position. In the meantime, the cyber activities of all three countries undermine their 
pretensions to moral leadership. Stuxnet exposed American use of offensive cyber 
capabilities and Edward Snowden disclosed the global surveillance activities of US 
intelligence agencies (Greenwald, 2014). These same agencies have confidently identified 
Russia as responsible for attempts to influence the 2016 presidential election through cyber 
means (ODNI, 2017). China’s record of political cyber surveillance and state-sponsored 
commercial cyberespionage has been the object of significant global attention for many years 
(Lindsay et al, 2015). 
 
The persistent violation of Westphalian sovereignty these actions represent is rapidly 
becoming the ‘cyber new normalcy’ (Korns, 2009). Received wisdom is that cyberspace 
favours offence over defence (e.g. Lynn, 2010), and cyberweapons are perceived as necessary 
means to restore the decisive advantage promised by early visions of cyberwar and 
informationalised warfare in general, as well as integral components of intelligence 
machineries. Specifically, cyberweapons are viewed as agents of compulsory power in and of 
themselves, with great potential for coercion in times of war and peace. This renders the use 
of cyberweapons an increasingly attractive proposition for states capable of developing or 
purchasing them. Several authors note that the offence-defence balance is not as radically 
destabilised by cyberweapons as is commonly supposed (Rid, 2013; Lindsay, 2013b, 2014) 
but there is good reason to be alert to a developing ‘cult of the offensive’ amongst policy-
makers, military leaders and intelligence officials (Slayton, 2016, p. 73). Significantly, this 
would suggest an emerging cyber ‘arms race’, supported by a burgeoning cyber military-
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industrial complex (Deibert, 2011). This is precisely the sort of situation that might 
eventually require an international treaty or arms control mechanism, which would throw the 
international community back upon all the problems of maintaining such a regime, given 
inherent difficulties in monitoring, verification and enforcement.  
 
OUTLOOK  
Weapons can be understood as ‘the violent materiality of the existential condition of 
uncertainty’ (Booth and Wheeler, 2008, p. 42). We may query whether cyberweapons are 
either violent or material but they do express and shape a condition of marked uncertainty in 
the contemporary international order. Silent, invisible and potentially very effective, they are 
attractive to states and non-state actors seeking advantage in war and in peace, a distinction 
blurred by just such tools as these. Physical attributes aside, they would seem to be suitable 
targets for regulation or prohibition, given the transnational nature of the problem and the 
lack of ability to deal with them on a national level (Nadelmann, 1990). Yet no unitary or 
global regime has emerged to regulate them. Indeed, the circulation of mutually corroborating 
powers outlined in the preceding account suggests that the barriers to regime formation are 
substantial. It might therefore be supposed that cyberweapons – or offensive cyber 
capabilities if we prefer – consist presently on the global level as ‘a transnational policy issue 
area characterized by the absence of multilateral institutions for ordering actors’ interactions’, 
that is, as a ‘nonregime’ (Dimitrov et al, 2007, p. 234). The central question, then, is how can 
a power-analytical approach to cyberweapons inform our understanding of this nonregime? 
 
Nonregimes may in time evolve into regimes but a range of factors inhibit this process. 
Cyberweapons governance is hampered by the nature of the digital environment, which 
affords multiple vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors. Their 
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unconventional physical nature also complicates potential identification and interdiction. 
Understood as a form of institutional power, Internet technologies prevent ready solutions to 
the problem of weaponised code, as well as creating significant friction for hegemonic 
aspirations for the Internet. However, states continue to desire and develop cyberweapons 
because of their perceived military and intelligence utility in the projection of compulsory 
power. This is despite those countries with the most developed cyber capabilities being 
perhaps those with most to lose by their use, given their socioeconomic hyperconnectivity. 
Particularly in the case of the US, its influence in the global malware marketplace represents 
a powerful instance of structural power, given how it disincentivises other actors both state 
and non-state. The general willingness of capable states to use offensive cyber capabilities 
further undermines attempts to generate global norms about cyberweapons use. The Tallinn 
Manual Process is an important node in western productive power but it seeks not to prohibit 
cyberweapons but to facilitate their use. In this respect, it puts cyberweapons on a legal 
footing equivalent to other weapons classes. Given the technological pre-eminence of the 
USA, it also serves to reproduce the power structures that enable American dominance in the 
first place. Unsurprisingly, this hegemonic ambition is challenged in diplomatic fora by the 
other great powers, which play the game of compulsory power through various means. They 
too, of course, seek to shape global norms through their own productive and institutional 
power, even if their ambitions differ from those of the US. Together, this manifold of powers 
prevents regime formation at the global level. 
 
It may be that states are not yet convinced of the need to regulate cyberweapons. Certainly, 
we have not yet seen sufficient evidence of their promised capabilities to engage the public 
imagination or to engender moral entrepreneurship on the issue (Nadelmann, 1990). There is 
also little political appetite for dispensing with these tools, which means that decisive 
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political will supporting prohibition is unlikely. The emphasis thus far has been on regulation, 
in keeping with other weapons classes, although these attempts are partial and contested. 
From a global governance perspective, however, analytical attention on prospective formal 
institutionalisation of norms and practices at the truly global level is perhaps misleading. All 
existing work on cyberweapons regulation and governance presents barriers to regime 
formation without recognising that global regimes are never perfect. They are all, in some 
sense, fragmented (Biermann et al, 2009), and fragmentation itself should not be viewed as 
terminally problematic. In the case of cyberweapons, the Tallinn Manual Process and 
Wassenaar Arrangement are significant steps towards a global governance architecture 
(Stevens, 2017). It should also be remembered that many potential uses of cyberweapons 
constitute crimes in most jurisdictions, and transnational regimes are developing in 
cybercrime policy.  
 
The sociotechnical environment through and over which cyberweapons governance would be 
expected to operate ‘has never been more in flux’ (Deibert, 2015, p. 15). Cyberwarfare and 
cyberweapons hit the front pages in 2016, taking centre-stage in a range of geopolitical 
conflict, particularly between the US and Russia. We may take issue with calling code a 
‘weapon’ but there is no doubt that states and other actors are using offensive cyber 
capabilities with growing confidence and relative impunity. If we perceive that regulation of 
these tools is necessary and socially beneficial, then the processes outlined above will have to 
be addressed as matters of urgency. Attention to the operations of power in this strategic, 
political and technological environment indicates some specific issues that will require 
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